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THE BAD NEWS OF : OBLITERATING THE
WALL BETWEEN CHURCH & STATE
Kevin W. Connell*
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has imposed upon school districts and
their constituent taxpayers the unconstitutional burden of endorsing and advancing
religion. By mandating that school districts embrace religion by granting access of
their facilities to religious organizations, the Supreme Court has polluted the in-
tegrity of both Church and State. Consequently, our natural born right to freedom
of conscience is under siege. This unconstitutional assault requires a judicial return
to strict separation if we are to preserve freedom from government impositions of
religion and the erosion of freedom of conscience in America.
Among our most sacred principles in the First Amendment, the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses protect individuals against being limited in their right to
practice religion under the former and from compulsion by the State under the
latter.1 Writing in 1802, Thomas Jefferson penned his famous letter to the Danbury
Baptist Association in response to concerns surrounding uncertain religious protec-
tions under the Connecticut Constitution.2 Asserting that religion has been intention-
ally removed from the public realm to our own private spheres, Jefferson declared
that “religion is a matter which lies solely between Man [and] his God, that he owes
account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legitimate powers of gov-
ernment reach actions only, [and] not opinions.”3
* Kevin W. Connell is a 2015 cum laude graduate of the University of Rochester and 2018
graduate of William & Mary Law School. After graduating, Kevin returned to his hometown
of Rochester, New York, where he began his career practicing education law representing
public school districts throughout the state of New York. Kevin is currently an associate at
Trevett Cristo, specializing in insurance law and labor law. In addition to his legal career,
Kevin has also published two books on higher education reform, titled Degrees of Deception:
America’s For-Profit Higher Education Fraud and Degrees of Deception: The College
Affordability Crisis & Our Next Financial Bubble.
This Article is dedicated to Professor Mark McGarvie for his life’s work concerning
religion and law in America.
1 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural
Restraint on Government Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 97–98, 100–01 (1998).
2 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson, President of the United States, to the Danbury Baptist
Association (Jan. 1, 1802), in 36 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1 DECEMBER 1802–3
March 1802, at 258 (Barbara B. Oberg et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter Letter from Thomas
Jefferson]; see also Letter from the Danbury Baptist Association to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 7,
1801), in 35 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 407–08.
3 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 2, at 258.
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This distinction of private and public spheres is implicit in the restructuring of
religious organizations during the early republic, when churches were converted
from public entities to “private voluntary associations.”4 Jefferson concludes that the
American people, through this restructuring, have built “a wall of separation be-
tween Church [and] State,” adding that a person’s natural rights include the “rights
of conscience,” including freedom from religious endorsement.5
Departing from this fundamental principle, the Supreme Court has chipped away
at Jefferson’s wall of separation in recent decades. Obliterating, brick by brick, the
founding principle of separation, the Supreme Court mandates access to publicly
funded school resources and facilities for religious organizations.6 In these cases,
modern Supreme Court jurisprudence grapples with two pivotal issues: (1) First
Amendment claims brought by religious organizations asserting viewpoint discrimi-
nation; and (2) Establishment Clause claims asserting affirmative defenses by school
districts.7 Jurisprudence surrounding this analysis has heavily favored the former
while virtually dismissing the latter.8 In doing so, the Supreme Court has confused the
issue from one of Establishment to Free Speech, thereby fueling the modern reac-
tionary social movement towards unification between Church and State during the
second half of the twentieth century.9 The result has been one of irreparable harm.
The Supreme Court has converted the religion clauses from a shield to a sword, al-
lowing religious organizations to infiltrate the public domain and impose their beliefs,
morals, and attitudes upon society.
Embodying this perversion from shield to sword in the context of public edu-
cation is the case of Good News Club v. Milford Central School, which held that
school districts may not engage in viewpoint discrimination by barring religious
organizations from accessing school facilities otherwise opened to the public.10
Specifically, the Court broadly held that “[w]hen Milford denied the Good News
Club access to the school’s limited public forum on the ground that the Club was
religious in nature, it discriminated against the Club because of its religious view-
point in violation of the Free Speech Clause under the First Amendment.”11 This
decision is wrongfully considered on two grounds.
4 MARK DOUGLAS MCGARVIE, ONE NATION UNDER LAW: AMERICA’S EARLY NATIONAL
STRUGGLES TO SEPARATE CHURCH AND STATE 3 (2004).
5 Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 2.
6 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 120 (2001); Lamb’s
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392–94 (1993).
7 See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 102; Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822–23 (1995).
8 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 113.
9 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 822–23; see also, e.g., Noah Feldman, A Church-State Solu-
tion, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/03/magazine/a-church
state-solution.html [https://perma.cc/C893-W5XD].
10 533 U.S. at 107–09.
11 Id. at 120.
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First, the Supreme Court fails to recognize the inherent endorsement of religion
through publicly funded benefits to religious organizations that result from mandating
access to public resources. When a religious organization is granted access to public
resources, taxpayers subsidize religion through financial support.12 Public funding
to religious organizations either directly funds religious activity or incidentally pays
for non-religious resources that allow religious organizations to divert more of their
own funding to religious activity. Whether direct or incidental, access to public re-
sources by religious organizations advances religion.
Second, even if the inherent endorsement theory is not accepted, the majority
opinion in Good News Club fails to distinguish between the different types of poten-
tial activity conducted by the religious organization while accessing public facilities.13
This activity includes traditional forms of speech, worship, and proselytization.14 Even
if the claim for broad exclusion is dismissed and general access to school resources
is granted, the activities of religious organizations should be limited to otherwise
secular forms of conduct consistent with other types of community group use. Re-
ligious worship or proselytization must be excluded from all public property.15
I. CURRENT STANDARD
Before exploring these two proposed alternatives, we must evaluate the current
standard established by Good News Club to understand how far Supreme Court
jurisprudence has ventured from separating Church and State as a means of protecting
freedom of conscience. Courts have recognized three criteria for evaluating these
cases: (1) the type of forum; (2) whether the policy is facially neutral; and (3) whether
there exists viewpoint discrimination.16
The basis of the forum analysis begins with the presumption that a school dis-
trict’s facilities are not open to the public for unlimited use.17 “Nothing in the Constitu-
tion requires the Government . . . to grant access to all who wish to exercise their
right to free speech on every type of Government property without regard to the nature
of the property or to the disruption that might be caused by the speaker’s activi-
ties.”18 From this basic understanding, “Freedom to speak on government property is
largely dependent on the nature of the forum in which the speech is delivered.”19
12 Esbeck, supra note 1, at 35–36; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy,
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 209–10 (1992).
13 See 533 U.S. at 111.
14 See id. at 130–33 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (distinguishing religious speech into three
categories).
15 See Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 650 F.3d 30, 51 (2d Cir. 2011).
16 Cf., e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985)
(using the criteria to examine a first amendment claim).
17 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 47–49 (1983).
18 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799–800.
19 Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 127 F.3d 207, 211 (2d Cir. 1997).
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Although the State has the authority to restrict speech, there are parameters on this
power.20 “The restriction must not discriminate against speech on the basis of
viewpoint, and the restriction must be ‘reasonable in light of the purpose served by
the forum.’”21
Judicial scrutiny of a school district’s intention to restrict use of its school facili-
ties “varies with the nature of the forum in which the speech occurs.”22 The Supreme
Court has recognized a spectrum of forums that determine the level of constitutional
protection that speech will be granted.23 “The categories from highest protection to
lowest are the traditional public forum, . . . the limited public forum, and the non-
public forum.”24
A “traditional public forum” is comprised of places “which ‘have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing pub-
lic questions.’”25 These include places like public sidewalks, parks, and others located
in the vast public commons.26 Government attempts to regulate the content of speech
in a traditional public forum will be the subject of strict judicial scrutiny.27 Any re-
strictions must be “necessary to serve a compelling [S]tate interest and [must be]
narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”28 Regulations of “time, place, and manner” in
a public forum will survive if they “are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels
of communication.”29
The “limited public forum” is established when the State “opens a non-public
forum but limits the expressive activity to certain kinds of speakers or to the discus-
sion of certain subjects.”30 In other words, “When the State establishes a limited public
forum, the State is not required to and does not allow persons to engage in every
type of speech.”31 Therefore, “The State may be justified ‘in reserving [its forum]
20 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001).
21 Id. at 106–07 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806).
22 Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 625 (2d Cir. 2005).
23 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44–46 (1983); see
also Peck, 426 F.3d at 625.
24 DeFabio v. E. Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist., 658 F. Supp. 2d 461, 473 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
25 Perry Educ. Ass’n., 460 U.S. at 45 (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S.
496, 515 (1939)).
26 Peck, 426 F.3d at 625–26.
27 Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Union Local 100 v. City of New York Dep’t of Parks &
Recreation, 311 F.3d 534, 545 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting N.Y. Magazine v. Metro. Transp. Auth.,
136 F.3d 123, 128 n.2 (2d Cir. 1998)).
31 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001).
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for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.’”32 The State’s power to
restrict speech, however, is not without limits. “The restriction must not discriminate
against speech on the basis of viewpoint, and the restriction must be ‘reasonable in
light of the purpose served by the forum.’”33 Consequently, the State may place re-
strictions on speech in a limited public forum so long as they are reasonable and
viewpoint-neutral.34
The forum with the lowest level of scrutiny is a “‘non-public forum,’ which is
neither traditionally open to public expression nor designated for such expression
by the State.”35 Additionally, with respect to all unspecified uses, school district prop-
erty remains a non-public forum.36 The Second Circuit justifies this broad restriction
on all unspecified uses by citing to Supreme Court precedent restricting various
forms of unspecified activity at schools, such as solicitations, political speeches, and
for-profit entities.37
Furthermore, “In addition to time, place, and manner restrictions, the State may
reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as
the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely
because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.”38 Specifically, “a speaker may
be excluded from a nonpublic forum if he wishes to address a topic not encompassed
within the purpose of the forum, or if he is not a member of the class of speakers for
whose especial benefit the forum was created.”39 However, “the government violates
the First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point
of view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject.”40
Considering these three fora, a public school district is not required to open its
facilities to outside organizations, but once it chooses to do so, it creates a limited
public forum. If a school district acknowledges that it has in the past and presently
does open the school facility to outside community groups for certain uses, the fa-
cility cannot be described as a non-public forum.41 Conversely, “public schools do not
possess all of the attributes of streets, parks, and other traditional public forums.”42
If a school district has opened its facilities to the public, it has not opened that
32 Id. (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)).
33 Id. at 106–07 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. &
Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
34 Id.
35 Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 626 (2d Cir. 2005).
36 See Deeper Life Christian Fellowship v. Bd. of Educ., 852 F.2d 676, 679 (2d Cir. 1988).
37 See id. at 679–80 (citing Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838–39 (1976); Lehman v. City
of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974)).
38 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983); see also
Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106–07.
39 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
40 Id.
41 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988).
42 Id.
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facility “for indiscriminate use by the general public.”43 Instead, a school district pre-
sumably exercises control over the use of its facilities, limiting public use in accor-
dance with its facility use policy.
Therefore, a school district falls squarely within the intermediate category of a
limited public forum when it opens its facilities to community organizations during
noninstructional hours. Although the classification of a school as a limited public
forum has been correctly decided, albeit for the misguided reasons of neutrality and
viewpoint discrimination, school districts have been wrongfully mandated to open
their limited public forums to religious organizations once the limited public forum
has been opened to the public.
The neutrality of policies regarding community access to school facilities and
resources is a flawed element of the religious access analysis under the status quo.
Although the State may be justified “in reserving [its forum] for certain groups or for
the discussion of certain topics,” the State’s power to restrict speech has been de-
termined by the Court to have strict limits.44 These strict limits have erroneously
included limits on restricting religious activity despite Establishment Clause prohibi-
tions.45 Despite this constitutional bar, the Supreme Court in Good News Club held
that “a significant factor in upholding governmental programs in the face of Estab-
lishment Clause attack is their neutrality towards religion.”46
The Supreme Court has further held that, “[i]n distinguishing between indoctri-
nation that is attributable to the State and indoctrination that is not, [the Court has]
consistently turned to the principle of neutrality, upholding aid that is offered to a broad
range of groups or persons without regard to their religion.”47 In other words, if a policy
is neutral, it will likely be upheld against an Establishment Clause challenge.48 To
clarify what it means for a policy to be “neutral,” the Supreme Court has set the stan-
dard that the “guarantee of neutrality is respected, not offended, when the government,
following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to recipients
whose ideologies and viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad and diverse.”49
Consequently, this standard suggests that the policy should be facially neutral in
its treatment of all community groups attempting to access public school resources.
If one community group has access to school facilities and resources, then the school
district must permit all community groups to use the facility regardless of their
43 Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 47.
44 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001) (quoting Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)).
45 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 877–78 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
46 533 U.S. at 114 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839).
47 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809 (Thomas, J., plurality opinion).
48 See id. at 838 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ.,
650 F.3d 30, 45 (2d Cir. 2011).
49 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 114 (internal quotation omitted) (quoting Rosenberger,
515 U.S. at 839).
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religious viewpoint.50 This broad standard of neutrality is blind to other constitu-
tional mandates, such as those prohibiting religious establishment, which are in-
herently unneutral.51
Despite the clearly unneutral mandate of the Establishment Clause, the current
standard also erroneously requires that restrictions on access must not discriminate
against speech on the basis of viewpoint and any restrictions must be “reasonable
in light of the purpose served by the forum.”52 The Supreme Court has ruled in favor
of religious organizations in several recent cases that consider the scope of view-
point discrimination in limited public forums.53 These decisions confuse the issue
from one of Establishment to Free Speech, ignoring the implications on religious
establishment that result from its misguided characterization of the issue as one of
religious speech.
In Widmar v. Vincent, the University of Missouri at Kansas City permitted a
variety of student groups to congregate at its facilities, and from 1973 until 1977, a
registered student group called “Cornerstone” was granted permission to meet on
University premises.54 Cornerstone was “an organization of evangelical Christian
students from various denominational backgrounds” that “sought access to the facili-
ties for the purpose of offering prayer, singing hymns, reading scripture, and teaching
biblical principles.”55 Cornerstone suggested, “Although these meetings would not
appear to a casual observer to correspond precisely to a traditional worship service,
there is no doubt that worship is an important part of the general atmosphere.”56
In 1977, the University withdrew its permission for Cornerstone to meet on Uni-
versity premises, relying on a regulation prohibiting the use of University facilities
“for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching.”57 The Supreme Court ruled
against the University, holding that the University had “created a forum generally
open for use by student groups” and that it “ha[d] discriminated against student groups
and speakers based on their desire to use a generally open forum to engage in re-
ligious worship and discussion.”58 In recognizing that religious worship and discus-
sion are “forms of speech and association protected by the First Amendment,” the
Court rejected the categorization of worship as a separate class of religious speech.59
The broad treatment of these two very different types of activity is significant
because it allows any form of religious activity, whether a discussion in an otherwise
50 See id. at 108–10.
51 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
52 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
53 See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392–94
(1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981).
54 454 U.S. at 265.
55 Id. at 265 n.2; id. at 283 (White, J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 283 (quoting Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 910 (W.D. Mo. 1979)).
57 Id. at 265 (majority opinion).
58 Id. at 267, 269.
59 Id. at 269 & n.6.
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secular form or a full church service. Such broad treatment of religious activity fails
to recognize the purpose of opening the limited public forum in the first place, in
that religious worship and proselytization are fundamentally different from other-
wise universal forms of discussion and activity that the forum is generally opened
to. Although Widmar concerned Universities, the Supreme Court later extended the
application of this standard to K–12 education in Board of Education of Westside
Community Schools v. Mergens.60
Twelve years later in Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District, a school district adopted a forum limitation that opened its facilities to “social,
civic, or recreational use” but prohibited use “for religious purposes.”61 Pursuant to
this policy, the school district denied the application of Lamb’s Chapel, an evangeli-
cal church, to use school facilities for a film series dealing with family and child-
rearing issues and containing the message that contemporary media influences “could
only be counterbalanced by returning to traditional, Christian family values.”62 The
school district denied the first application because the film was “church related,” as
well as the second application that characterized the film as a “[f]amily oriented
movie—from a Christian perspective.”63 Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded
that the policy was an impermissible viewpoint restriction.64 It noted that lectures
on child rearing and family values were within the “social or civic purposes” for
which the forum was open and held that the school district’s denial of the applica-
tion due to its religious perspective was invalid.65
In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia, decided just two
years after Lamb’s Chapel, the Supreme Court considered the University of Virginia’s
limited forum.66 Specifically, the forum consisted of Student Activities Funds that
were available to student groups for activities “related to the educational purpose of
the University,” including “student news, information, opinion, entertainment, or aca-
demic communications media groups.”67 The funding was not available for religious
activity or activity that “primarily promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or
about a deity or an ultimate reality.”68 Plaintiffs’ student organization sought funding
to publish, “Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia,” a
student publication that “offer[ed] a Christian perspective on both personal and com-
munity issues, especially those relevant to college students at the University of
Virginia.”69 The paper committed “to challenge Christians to live, in word and deed,
60 See 496 U.S. 226, 234 (1990).
61 508 U.S. 384, 387 (1993).
62 Id. at 387–89.
63 Id. at 388–89.
64 See id. at 393–94.
65 Id.
66 515 U.S. 819, 824 (1995).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 825.
69 Id. at 826.
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according to the faith they proclaim and to encourage students to consider what a
personal relationship with Jesus Christ means.”70
The application for funding was denied on the ground that the paper was a
“religious activity” within the meaning of the forum rules.71 Although, like the school
district in Lamb’s Chapel,72 the University argued that its denial of the application
was based on the content of the religious activity, not on viewpoint, the Supreme
Court concluded that “[t]he prohibited perspective, not the general subject matter,
resulted in the refusal to . . . [fund plaintiffs’ paper], for the subjects discussed were
otherwise within the approval category of publications.”73
Finally, in Good News Club v. Milford Central School, the Supreme Court
resolved the “conflict among the Courts of Appeals on the question whether speech
can be excluded from a limited public forum on the basis of the religious nature of
the speech.”74 One of the primary conflicts was considered against the backdrop of
Bronx Household, which the Court characterized as “concluding that a ban on
religious services and instruction in the limited public forum was constitutional.”75
Specifically, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Second Circuit’s holding in
Good News Club that the “characterization of the Club’s activities as religious in
nature warranted treating the Club’s activities as different in kind from the other
activities permitted by the school.”76
Another issue weighed in this case concerned the distinction between religious
worship services and proselytization from other forms of speech with a religious
viewpoint. The Court specifically held, in its assumed limited public forum, the
school district could not prohibit activities that, while “quintessentially religious,”
were not “mere religious worship, divorced from any teaching of moral values” and
that a prohibition of those activities would constitute viewpoint discrimination.77
The Supreme Court also examined several additional claims pertaining to com-
munity and student perception of endorsement in the context of granting religious
organizations access to the school facilities. The Court not only concluded that the
community would not be “coerced into engaging in the Good News Club’s religious
activities” because “the children [could not] attend without their parents’ permis-
sion,” but further held that “possible misperceptions by schoolchildren” who might
be present at school facilities during non-instructional hours does not justify “fore-
close[ing] private religious conduct.”78
70 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
71 Id. at 827.
72 Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 387–89 (1993).
73 Rosenberger, 595 U.S. at 831.
74 533 U.S. 98, 105 (2001).
75 Id. at 105–06 (citing Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 127 F.3d
207 (2d Cir. 1997)).
76 Id. at 110–11.
77 Id. at 111–12, 112 n.4.
78 Id. at 115, 117.
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Collectively, these cases have classified restrictions on religious organizational
access to school facilities as viewpoint discrimination, deeming each of the restric-
tions unconstitutional.79 Ultimately, the current standard set by Good News Club and
other Supreme Court jurisprudence requires school districts to neutrally open their
facilities and offer their resources to all community organizations, despite their reli-
gious affiliation, once they have granted access to any community group as a limited
public forum.80 This standard ignores the unneutral mandate of the Establishment
Clause, and should be overturned as a result.81
II. ABSOLUTE SEPARATION
Contrary to the Good News Club standard of neutrality, which encourages public
endorsement and advancement of religion, the Establishment Clause requires a stan-
dard of absolute separation.82 This separationist position, which holds that Church
and State should operate distinctly within their own private and public spheres, is
a stark contrast from that of the Good News Club standard of neutrality.83 Proponents
of neutrality tend to subscribe as accommodationists, who believe that Church and
State should coexist in the public sphere and religion “should help set the moral
direction of civil society.”84
Ultimately, these juxtaposing philosophies have served as the polarities of a
fierce political debate that has invaded the legal realm. This misplaced politically
charged legal fight has resulted in a heated battle between honoring the Establish-
ment Clause with a bright line rule of separation and tarnishing the Establishment
Clause through blurring the line between Church and State. David Sehat, Professor
of History and Religion in American Life at Georgia State University, suggests that
“[t]he debate over the public role of religion in American life has now entered its
sixth decade of intense conflict.”85 Over the course of this intense half-century con-
flict, the Supreme Court has erroneously embraced the accommodationist view in
this debate, electing to erode, rather than defend, the Establishment Clause.
Lynch v. Donnelly illustrates the Supreme Court’s fervent adoption of the ac-
commodationist position in recent decades.86 There, the Supreme Court held that
“[r]ather than mechanically invalidating all governmental conduct or statutes that
79 See cases cited supra notes 53–78 and accompanying text.
80 See cases cited supra notes 53–78 and accompanying text.
81 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
82 Compare Good New Club, 533 U.S. at 114, with U.S. CONST. amend. I.
83 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I (explicitly forbidding “laws respecting an establishment
of religion”), with Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 114 (emphasizing neutrality towards religion
as an important factor).
84 A. JAMES REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 3 (1985).
85 DAVID SEHAT, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 283 (2011).
86 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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confer benefits or give special recognition to religion in general or to one faith—as
an absolutist approach would dictate,” it should instead “scrutinize[ ] challenged
legislation or official conduct to determine whether, in reality, it establishes a religion
or religious faith, or tends to do so.”87 This standard is perplexing because after recog-
nizing the existence of conferred benefits and special recognition, the Supreme
Court neglects to hold that such benefits or recognition endorse or advance religion
even though such endorsement or advancement is inherent on its face.
This standard creates confusion regarding earlier jurisprudence addressing
conferred benefits and special recognition. In Committee for Public Education and
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, the Supreme Court held that it is “firmly established
that a law may be one ‘respecting an establishment of religion’ even though its con-
sequence is not to promote a ‘state religion,’ and even though it does not aid one
religion more than another but merely benefits all religions alike.”88 Although the
Supreme Court went on to hold that “not every law that confers an ‘indirect,’ ‘remote,’
or ‘incidental’ benefit upon religious institutions is, for that reason alone, constitu-
tionally invalid,” a law may not “further[ ] any of the evils against which that Clause
protects. Primary among these evils have been ‘sponsorship, financial support, and
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.’”89 Thus, any form of “finan-
cial support,” including that of providing a free facility with free running water, free
electricity, free furniture, and countless other free publicly funded resources, creates
by definition what the Supreme Court has determined to be a primary evil against
which the Clause protects.90
In order to protect the right of conscience, the Court must classify monetary
endorsements and advancements of religion as evils against which the Establishment
Clause is intended to prevent. Accommodationists view human conscience as some-
thing that ought to be influenced by religion for the good of civil society.91 Derek H.
Davis, Director of the J.M. Dawson Institute on Church-State Studies at Baylor Uni-
versity, notes the utilitarian benefit of religion to society, thereby seeming to justify
limitations of the Establishment Clause.92 “A broad evangelicalism provide[s] the
religious glue for the republic, establishe[s] the ethical norms that st[and] above parties,
creeds, and denominations, and inform[s] the conscience[ ] and mold[s] the lifestyles
of most Americans.”93 Under this philosophy of State-sponsored religious morals,
“nationalism [is] integrated into civil religion through a marriage of evangelical
87 Id. at 678.
88 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973) (first citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971);
then citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (internal citations omitted)).
89 Id. at 771–72 (emphasis added) (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
90 Id. at 772.
91 Richard V. Pierard, The Role of Civil Religion in American Society, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 479, 487 (Derek H. Davis ed., 2010).
92 Id.
93 Id. (emphasis added).
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Christianity and . . . democracy.”94 Providing a “basic moral law,” accommodationists
strive toward a civil religion in which the boundaries of Church and State are blurred
and their distinct missions are diluted into a single mission of moral governance.95
A fine line exists between informing and invading the free conscience of indi-
viduals. Publicly funded resources must respect the constitutionally guaranteed right
of conscience, protecting believers of one faith from the need to support another and
non-believers from the need to support any religion. When the State forces individu-
als to endorse or advance religion by making available publicly funded resources to
religious organizations, it crosses the threshold from informing into invasion.
Despite the Supreme Court’s endorsement of neutrality, members of the Court have
noted that the Establishment Clause is intended “to guarantee the individual right
to conscience. The right to conscience, in the religious sphere, is not only implicated
when the government engages in direct or indirect coercion.”96 Rather, “[i]t is also
implicated when the government requires individuals to support the practices of a
faith with which they do not agree.”97
After establishing this fundamental principle that religious coercion, whether
direct or indirect, violates the sacred right to conscience, the Supreme Court has con-
fused “separation” as being synonymous with “neutrality.”98 In fact, these two terms
represent the philosophical poles of the debate between separationists and accommoda-
tionists. While separation supports a clear division between Church and State, neutrality
has proven to open the flood gates for the religious invasion of the public sphere and
infestation of individual freedom of conscience. Religious pollution of the public
sphere is critical because as private voluntary associations, religious organizations
ought to be “nongovernmental institutions that remain apart from government in
order to counterbalance the power of the [S]tate. [Forming part of civil society,]
[t]hey are the voluntary expressions of like-minded peoples’ association and can, but
need not, form the basis of political organization and lobbying.”99
With this understanding, Professor Sehat asserts that “civil society protects indi-
viduals from governmental intrusion and nongovernmental oppression. It preserves
a disorderly space that provides a buffer between the power of the [S]tate and
freedom of individuals.”100 Proponents of civil religion, however, seek to eliminate
this buffer. Relying upon coercion through forced endorsement and advancement
of religion by channeling public funding and resources to religious organizations,
the individual right to conscience is defiled. Neutrality has proven to render the
Establishment Clause toothless against claims of viewpoint discrimination, which
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 803 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 SEHAT, supra note 85, at 285.
100 Id.
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then require public schools to advance and endorse religion through making publicly
funded resources available to religious organizations.101 Absolute separation is the best
way to ensure protection against coercion of conscience. Without absolute separation,
we have proven to sacrifice the individual right to conscience on the altar of neutrality.
III. GENERAL ACCESS WITH WORSHIP & PROSELYTIZING EXCEPTION
If the argument for absolute separation is dismissed and general access to school
facilities is granted to religious organizations, then there should at least be restrictions
placed on the type of activity permitted by such organizations while they are meeting
on school property. Since the Good News Club decision, the Second Circuit has estab-
lished such a standard, which challenges the Supreme Court’s dilution of the distinction
between content-based and viewpoint-based restrictions.102 In Bronx Household of
Faith v. Board of Education the City of New York, the Second Circuit ruled that the
exclusion of worship services from public schools was content-based, not viewpoint-
based, and justified by reasonable concern of the school board that permitting use
of school facilities for worship services would violate the Establishment Clause.103
On the issue of content versus viewpoint discrimination, the Second Circuit
ruled that the prohibition bars a type of activity, not a point of view.104 Specifically,
Bronx Household held that “The conduct of religious worship services, which the
rule excludes, is something quite different from free expression of a religious point
of view.”105 Elaborating on this distinction, the decision further held, “[t]he conduct
of services is the performance of an event or activity. While the conduct of religious
services undoubtedly includes expressions of a religious point of view, it is not the
expression of that point of view that is prohibited by the rule.”106 Regarding what
specific actions constitute worship, the Second Circuit clarified that “[p]rayer, reli-
gious instruction, expression of devotion to God, and the singing of hymns, whether
done by a person or a group, do not constitute the conduct of worship services. Those
activities are not excluded.”107
While each of the activities are rooted in a religious viewpoint, the Second
Circuit properly distinguishes between the content of the actions themselves and
their viewpoint basis.108 Referring to various secular activities, the Second Circuit
illustrates the “important difference between excluding the conduct of an event or
activity that includes expression of a point of view, and excluding the expression of
101 See cases cited supra notes 53–78 and accompanying text.
102 See, e.g., Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 650 F.3d 30, 39–40 (2d Cir. 2011).
103 Id.
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that point of view.”109 The Second Circuit held that “schools may exclude from their
facilities all sorts of activities” consistent with the purpose of the forum, “such as
martial arts matches, livestock shows, and horseback riding.”110 Correctly identifying
what is actually being restricted by the State, “[t]he basis for the lawful exclusion
of such activities is not viewpoint discrimination, but rather the objective of avoiding
either harm to persons or property, or liability, or a mess, which those activities may
produce” due to the specific content they possess.111
Although a school district may not selectively ban the celebration of an activity,
it may, for reasonable cause, ban the activity itself.112 “While a school may prohibit
the use of its facilities for such activities for valid reasons, it may not selectively
exclude meetings that would celebrate martial arts, cow breeding, or horseback
riding, because that would be viewpoint discrimination.”113 However, “[w]hen there
exists a reasonable basis for excluding a type of activity or event in order to preserve
the purposes of the forum, such content-based exclusion survives First Amendment
challenges notwithstanding that participants might use the event to express their
celebration of the activity.”114
Transitioning back to a religious context, the Second Circuit ruled that although the
school district was not permitted to restrict the celebration of worship, it was permitted
to prohibit “conduct of a particular type of event: a collective activity characteristically
done according to an order prescribed by and under the auspices of an organized re-
ligion, typically but not necessarily conducted by an ordained official of the religion,”
otherwise referred to as a “religious worship service.”115 Because of this distinction,
the Second Circuit held, “The conduct of a ‘religious worship service’ has the effect
of placing centrally, and perhaps even of establishing, the religion in the school.”116
To illustrate the appropriate premise of this distinction, the Second Circuit
stated, “We think, with confidence, that if 100 randomly selected people were polled
as to whether they attend ‘worship services,’ all of them would understand the ques-
tioner to be inquiring whether they attended services of religious worship.”117 The
decision went on to conclude, “[w]hile it is true that the word ‘worship’ is occasionally
used in nonreligious contexts, such as to describe a miser, who is said to ‘worship’
money, or a fan who ‘worships’ a movie star, the term ‘worship services’ has no
similar use.”118
109 Id. at 37.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 38.
113 Id. (emphasis added).
114 Id. (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30
(1995)).
115 Id. at 37.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 38.
118 Id. at 38–39.
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Directly confronting the aforementioned Supreme Court decisions in Widmar,
Lamb’s Chapel, and Good News Club, the Second Circuit definitively establishes
a new standard in Bronx Household.119 The distinction lies in the understanding that
in each of the earlier cases, “the policy being enforced categorically excluded expres-
sions of religious content. Here, by contrast, there is no restraint on the free expres-
sion of any point of view.”120 The foundation to the Second Circuit’s refined standard
is that while the “[e]xpression of all points of view is permitted. The exclusion applies
only to the conduct of a certain type of activity—the conduct of worship services—
and not to the free expression of religious views associated with it.”121 Consequently,
the proposed standard recognizes a need to grant general access to avoid viewpoint
discrimination claims, school districts ought to be permitted to restrict the activity
of religious organizations after being admitted as content-based restraints.122
As a content-based, not viewpoint-based, restriction, the question then falls to
whether the exclusion is “reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.”123
Supreme Court precedent under this standard calls for giving “appropriate regard”
to the Board’s judgment as to which activities are compatible with its reasons for
opening schools to public use.124 By excluding religious worship services, the school
district seeks to avoid violating the Establishment Clause, and “[t]here is no doubt
that compliance with the Establishment Clause is a [S]tate interest sufficiently com-
pelling to justify content-based restrictions on speech.”125
To determine whether the content restriction for this purpose is reasonable and
permissible, it should be determined that “the Board has a strong basis for concern
that permitting use of a public school for the conduct of religious worship services
would violate the Establishment Clause.”126 When deciding the basis for concern,
the test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman controls, which provides the framework for
evaluating challenges under the Establishment Clause.127 Specifically, government
action which interacts with religion (1) “must have a secular . . . purpose,” (2) must
119 Id. at 38, 43–45.
120 Id. at 39.
121 Id.
122 See id.
123 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 893 n.12 (1995) (Souter,
J., dissenting) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
806 (1985)).
124 Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 687 (2010).
125 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761–62 (1995) (citing
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981)).
126 Bronx Household, 650 F.3d at 40 (citing Marchi v. Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 173 F.3d
469, 476 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[W]hen government endeavors to police itself and its employees in
an effort to avoid transgressing Establishment Clause limits, it must be accorded some leeway,
even though the conduct it forbids might not inevitably be determined to violate the Estab-
lishment Clause.”)).
127 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
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have a “principal or primary effect . . . that neither advances nor inhibits religion,”
and (3) “must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.”128
Considering the test in Lemon, the Second Circuit distinguished further religious
worship services from other religious activities, stating: “The performance of worship
services is a core event in organized religion . . . . Religious worship services are
conducted according to the rules dictated by the particular religious establishment
and are generally performed by an officiant of the church or religion.”129 Even more
compelling, the Second Circuit held, “When worship services are performed in a
place, the nature of the site changes. The site is no longer simply a room in a school
being used temporarily for some activity,” rather, “[t]he church has made the school
the place for the performance of its rites, and might well appear to have established
itself there. The place has, at least for a time, become the church.”130 Pursuant to this
standard, religious worship services, proselytization, and other similar conduct should
be exempt from general access by religious organizations if absolute separation is
not adopted.
CONCLUSION
The current standard set out by the Supreme Court under Good News Club requires
school districts, as limited public forums, to adopt neutral policies that force public
schools to make their facilities available to religious organizations.131 Mandating a
policy of neutrality, rather than separation, the Supreme Court has promoted coercion
of conscience by channeling publicly funded resources that advance and endorse reli-
gion.132 This standard of neutrality, synonymous with advancement and endorsement,
should be replaced with a principle of absolute separation to avoid furthering the evils
against which the Establishment Clause protects. If absolute separation is not adopted,
then the Supreme Court should at least restrict religious organizations from engaging
in religious worship services, proselytization, and other comparable activities in public
facilities in order to prevent the conversion of our public schools into churches.
Enthralled by the recent political movement of religious invasion into the public
sphere, the Supreme Court has chipped away at Jefferson’s wall of separation brick
by brick through its endorsement of the neutrality standard.133 Neutrality protects
neither believers of one faith from the coercion of supporting another, nor non-
believers from the coercion to support any religion at all. Violating the Establishment
Clause’s mandate that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
128 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
129 Bronx Household, 650 F.3d at 41.
130 Id.
131 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 120 (2001).
132 See cases cited supra notes 53–78 and accompanying text.
133 See cases cited supra notes 53–78 and accompanying text.
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religion,” neutrality has unequivocally gone beyond establishing a religion by es-
tablishing all religion.134
An immediate separationist response is necessary if we are to prevent the total
obliteration of Jefferson’s wall entirely. If we expect the individual right of consci-
ence to survive, neutrality must be replaced with separation, whether as an absolute
restriction or as exceptions for the most severe forms of religious activity. No matter
which form of substitution prevails, separation is our best hope of honoring the
Establishment Clause and shielding the right to conscience it confers to all believers
and non-believers alike.
134 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
